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I find that firms can successfully exploit the consumer if and only
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1 Introduction
According to Herbert Simon (1955),
in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are eval-
uated before a choice is made. In actual human decision-making,
alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may
not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure.
When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the
first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one
actually selected.
The ‘satisficing’ heuristic assumes that the decision-maker discovers and
analyzes alternatives sequentially and, rather than performing a complicated
calculation to derive the optimal stopping rule, follows a simple procedure:
if you are satisfied with the current alternative stop, if not keep searching.
Once you stop, choose the best discovered alternative (Simon, 1955).1
In this paper I propose a market model in which two profit-maximizing
firms producing a homogeneous good compete on prices for a satisficing con-
sumer and influence his aspiration price (the price regarded as satisfactory)
via marketing. This research question is relevant for several reasons. First,
despite the importance of the satisficing theory, little attention has been
devoted to its implications within an industrial organization setting. This
study complements the growing literature in behavioural industrial organi-
zation (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2015). Second, there is experimental evidence
supporting the hypothesis that decision-makers behave according to the sat-
isficing heuristic (Caplin, Dean and Martin, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011).
In addition theorists that have recently studied the choice-theoretic foun-
dations of the satisficing heuristic have provided a deeper understanding of
1The version of the satisficing heuristic studied here is called best-satisficing in the
sense that if the decision-maker does not find any satisfactory product, then he buys
the best unsatisfactory one among those discovered. Alternatively, last-satisficing implies
that if no satisfactory product is identified, the decision-maker buys the last discovered
product (e.g. see Rubinstein and Salant (2006)). A third possibility is that if there is no
satisfactory product, the consumer chooses nothing (he postpones). In a market context,
best-satisficing is a plausible assumption in the circumstances in which the consumer
urgently needs a product.
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its behavioural implications (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006; Caplin and Dean,
2011).2 For instance, a satisficing decision-maker’s choice behaviour is irra-
tional from a revealed preference’s viewpoint if and only if either the ordering
according to which he examines the alternatives or his aspiration level are not
fixed. Third, in market models of price competition with rational consumers
and homogeneous products, the decision of stopping the search process prior
to exploring all alternatives is determined by the presence of search costs
(Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989). On the contrary, in my model the
consumer decides to truncate search in advance as soon as the inspected price
meets his aspiration price, which is assumed to be influenced by firms via
marketing. It is therefore interesting to analyze the impact on the equilib-
rium outcome of firms being able to affect the consumers’ search behaviour
through advertising. What pricing and marketing strategies will the firms
use when competing for a satisficing consumer? Do firms’ price and market-
ing strategies harm the consumer? Does the consumer’s welfare improve if
firms are prevented from manipulating the consumer’s aspiration price? In
the paper I provide an answer to all these questions.
My model assumes that two profit-maximizing firms simultaneously choose
a price p from the unit interval and a costless marketing signal s aimed at
influencing the consumer’s aspiration price. The consumer follows the sat-
isficing heuristic described above and his maximum willingness to pay for
the product is normalized to one. The consumer is assigned to firm i with
probability 1
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(his default) and his decision of inspecting firm j depends on
whether or not firm i charges a price that meets his aspiration price, which is
endogenously determined, with i ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. I consider the simplest
setting by assuming that firms can send out either a low or a high marketing
signal (zero or one, respectively). I assume that the consumer’s aspiration
price is a convex combination of the two signals he receives, where the weight
assigned to the high marketing signal is captured by an exogenous parame-
ter α ∈ (0, 1). The parameter α measures the consumer’s propensity to stop
searching, as a higher (resp., lower) α weakly increases (resp., decreases) the
2I will discuss the experimental and theoretical studies on satisficing in the literature-
review section.
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consumer’s aspiration price, other things equal.3 An interpretation is that
the consumer receives one marketing signal from each firm prior to starting
the search process. Then, through a more or less conscious process (which I
call aspiration-price function), he forms an aspiration price, which determines
his search behaviour, by combining the two signals he receives.4
As an example, assume that a satisficing consumer wants to buy a PlaySta-
tion. There are two stores in town and the consumer is not aware of the
prices that they charge. His plan is to first visit the store nearby, find out
what price it charges, and in case it is satisfactory buy the product. Oth-
erwise, he plans to visit the other store.5 Suppose that stores publicize (via
leaflets, radio, TV, internet) the fact that their PlayStations are running out
of stock. This information puts pressure on the consumer and plausibly in-
creases the chances that he is willing to stop searching at the store nearby,
even though the price it charges is relatively high. The reason is that the
consumer is afraid that by postponing the purchase and visiting the com-
petitor, the stores will run out of products. That is, the marketing signal of
reduced product availability increases the consumer’s aspiration price and,
consequently, reduces his willingness to search.6
An interesting implication of the model is that firms’ marketing deci-
sions induce three different consumer types. When both firms choose s = 0,
the consumer is a shopper. That is, he is ‘never satisfied’ and his search
behaviour is equivalent to that of a standard Bertrand’s consumer. An unin-
3When both firms send out a high (resp., low) signal, the consumer’s aspiration price
is equal to 1 (resp., 0). When firms send out different signals, his aspiration price is α.
4In a section below, besides the aspiration-price function described here, I discuss other
processes through which marketing signals determine the consumer’s aspiration price by
linking my framework to related models, such as Bertrand (1883), Varian (1980), and
Piccione and Spiegler (2012).
5An alternative interpretation is that the consumer first inspects the price charged by
the store whose web-site appears first on Google. If it is not satisfactory, he visits the
second web-site on the list.
6Similarly, the announcement that the provisions of the product under consideration are
substantial relaxes the pressure on the consumer, presumably reduces his aspiration price,
and, consequently, induces more active search behaviour. If firms send out conflicting
product-availability messages, then the tradeoff is resolved via a compromise. That is, the
formation of an intermediate aspiration price. I will further discuss the convex-combination
aspiration-price function in section 3.
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formed consumer, on the other hand, occurs when both firms choose s = 1
and is characterized by the fact that he is satisfied at any price level and al-
ways sticks to the default firm. Finally, when firms send out different signals,
the consumer is a conditional shopper. That is, he inspects both firms
only if the price charged by the default firm is strictly greater than α ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, α can also be interpreted as the conditional shopper’s aspiration
price. While the first two types have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture (e.g. see Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chiovenau and Zhou (2013)),
the latter is one of the novel aspects of the model: unlike in the existing
models, in this framework whether a consumer makes a price comparison
simultaneously depends on the marketing and the pricing decisions made by
firms.
In a section below (theorems 1 and 2) I fully characterize the unique
symmetric equilibrium under the assumption that firms can manipulate the
consumer’s aspiration price. I show that firms randomize over both market-
ing signals and prices. As one expects, in equilibrium the probability that a
low (resp., high) signal is sent out is decreasing (resp., increasing) in α. Con-
ditional on sending out a low signal, firms randomize over the price according
to an atomless cdf. On the contrary, conditional on sending out a high signal,
firms charge two prices only - α and 1 - with positive probability. Interest-
ingly when α is low there is a gap in the support of pricing cdf conditional
on sending out a low signal located at (α, pˆ) with pˆ ∈ (α, 1). The reason is
that by increasing the price from α to a price just above α, firms lose market
power, because the conditional shopper does not stop searching anymore at
the default. This is because the price the default charges is not any longer
satisfactory to the conditional shopper and, as a result, the increase in the
price from α to a price just above it does not offset the loss in market shares.
On the other hand, as soon as α increases above a certain threshold the gap
in the support disappears in the sense that only a price interval below α is
assigned positive mass.
In order to fully understand the effect of firms manipulating the aspiration
prices, I also characterize (theorem 3) the unique symmetric equilibrium
under the assumption that consumer’s aspiration prices are exogenously given
(e.g. aspiration prices are based on previous experience). I find that firms
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randomize over the price according to an atomless cdf. The structure of the
support of the equilibrium cdf depends on α: when α is relatively low (resp.,
high), then the support is connected and firms assign positive mass to a
price interval of relatively high (resp., low) prices. On the contrary, when α
is intermediate, then the support contains a gap analogous to that described
in the previous paragraph.
The paper contains two main results. First, under endogenous aspiration
prices, firms’ profits are greater than the max-min payoff - the constrained
competitive level - when α is below a certain threshold and equal it, else-
where. The constrained competitive level is the minimum level of profits
firms can guarantee, given the consumer’s bounded rationality. Recall that
α measures the consumer’s propensity to stop searching. Hence, decreasing
α - or, equivalently, increasing the consumer’s propensity search - leads to
exploitation in the sense that competitive forces are unable to reduce firms’
profits to the constrained competitive level.7 This result is surprising and
hard to reconcile with a model of price competition with rational consumers,
because it is essentially saying that exploitation occurs (resp., does not oc-
cur) when the consumer’s propensity to search is sufficiently high (resp., low),
other things equal. The intuition behind it has to do with the gap in the
support of the pricing cdf conditional on sending out a low signal mentioned
above. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms do not have an incentive
to charge prices slightly greater than α, because, for a sufficiently small ,
by increasing the price from α to α+  firms lose market power, as the con-
ditional shopper does not stop searching at the default any more. In order
to offset the loss in market shares, firms must charge prices greater than a
threshold pˆ, which in turn is strictly greater than α. As a result, only when α
is sufficiently low, the threshold pˆ is smaller than the consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay and firms can profitably charge high prices (i.e., prices in
the interval [pˆ, 1)). On the contrary, when α is high, the threshold pˆ is greater
than the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, implying that firms can
charge only relatively low prices (i.e., smaller than α). Hence, the source
of extra profits above the constrained competitive level is given by the fact
7Other papers studying oligopoly models define exploitation as the difference between
firms equilibrium profits and the max-min payoff. E.g. see Piccione and Spiegler (2012).
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that, when the consumer’s propensity to search is high, firms charge high
unsatisfactory prices.
Second, under exogenous aspiration prices firms’ equilibrium profits are
equal to the max-min payoff for any value of α. That is, when firms cannot
influence the consumer’s search behaviour, then competitive forces success-
fully prevent consumer’s exploitation. This finding is not obvious, because
the consumer’s choice behaviour is irrational from a revealed preference’s
viewpoint regardless of whether or not firms can manipulate the consumer’s
aspiration price. This result, along with the first finding, implies that firms
exploit the consumer if and only if the consumer’s propensity to search is suf-
ficiently high and firms can influence aspiration prices. Moreover, by fixing
the distribution of consumer types, I find that firms profits are higher under
endogenous than under exogenous aspiration prices for any value of α.
The implications of these results for policy are two-fold. First, the atten-
tion of the policy-makers should be devoted to the regulation of marketing
campaigns with the objective of preventing firms from manipulating the con-
sumer’s willingness to search, because satisficing consumers are better off
when firms cannot have an influence on their search behaviour. Second, in
case policy-makers are unable to prevent firms from manipulating the con-
sumers’ aspiration prices, then they should not incentivize an increase in the
consumer’s propensity to search, because this may lead to exploitation.
Along with an extensive discussion of the intuition behind these results, in
the comparative statics section I also investigate the consumer’s type distri-
bution, the consumer’s search behaviour, and the switching rates in equilib-
rium. I show that under endogenous aspiration prices, when α is low (resp.,
high), the most frequent consumer’s type is shopper (resp., uninformed). On
the other hand, when α is intermediate, conditional shopper is the most likely
type. Interestingly, I also find that the equilibrium probability that only one
firm is inspected is higher under exogenous than under endogenous aspiration
prices. This finding is surprising, as one is led to think that greater com-
petition implies lower profits. On the contrary, as stated above, I find that
firms make higher profits under endogenous than under exogenous aspiration
prices. The intuition is that less stopping is a consequence of the fact that
firms charge relatively higher (unsatisfactory) prices and more stopping is a
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consequence of the fact that firms charge relatively low (satisfactory) prices.
Since higher prices correspond to higher profits, then this in turn implies
that less (resp., more) stopping leads to higher (resp., lower) profits. The
analysis of switching rates yields similar results (i.e., there is more switching
under endogenous than under exogenous aspiration prices).
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on behavioural industrial organiza-
tion (Ellison, 2006; Armstrong, 2008; Spiegler, 2011). The well-known Var-
ian (1980)’s model assumes that firms simultaneously compete on price and
there is a fraction of consumers (shoppers) that make a price comparison and
a fraction of consumers (uninformed) that stick to the default.8 Both Carlin
(2009) and Chiovenau and Zhou (2013) extend Varian (1980) by assuming
that the fraction of informed and uninformed consumers is endogenously
determined. In Carlin (2009)’s model along with a price firms choose its
complexity and it is assumed that more complex price structures reduce the
fraction of informed consumers. On the other hand, Chiovenau and Zhou
(2013) assume that firms can manipulate the extent to which consumers are
informed by framing their products in a certain way and, unlike in Carlin
(2009), in their model how a firm’s frame influences the extent to which a
price comparison is made depends upon the competitors’ frame decisions. Fi-
nally, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) focus their attention on the two-firm case
by considering a more general framework than Chiovenau and Zhou (2013).9
Their most important result is that competitive forces drive firms profits
to the max-min level in equilibrium if and only if each firm can neutralize
the effects of the opponent’s framing decisions by choosing a suitable mix-
ture of frames (this property is called Weighted Regularity). Unlike all these
studies, my model implies that whether or not a price comparison is made,
depends on both pricing and marketing strategies. In particular, whenever
the consumer’s aspiration price is some intermediate price α ∈ (0, 1), then
the consumer makes a price comparison, only if the price charged by the
8Actually Varian (1980) is considered to be a model of standard industrial organization.
However, I discuss it here for expositional purposes.
9See Spiegler (2014) for an extension.
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default firm is strictly greater than α. On the contrary, in the above models
the consumer’s decision of sticking to the default is independent of the price
it charges.
This paper is also related to the non-behavioural industrial organization
literature on consumer search. Burdett and Judd (1983) investigate a com-
petitive market with non-sequential consumer search. Stahl (1989), on the
other hand, bridges the gap between the polar results obtained by Bertrand
(1883) (firms charge the price equal to the marginal cost in the absence of
search costs) and Diamond (1971) (firms charge the monopoly price if search
costs are bounded above zero) by assuming sequential search. More recently,
Arbatskaya (2007) and Zhou (2011) propose a model in which the consumer
inspects firms according to a fixed ordering by assuming homogeneous and
differentiated products, respectively. Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009b),
on the other hand, assume that the consumer first inspects a ‘prominent’
firm and, in case he is not satisfied with its product, examines the remaining
firms in a random order in a framework of differentiated products. Finally,
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009a) extend Burdett and Judd (1983) to
study the effect of two protection policies (price cap and ability to refuse in-
formative marketing) on the consumers’ incentives to explore relatively more
firms. Unlike my work, these studies explicitly formalize search costs and
assume that the consumer searches optimally. On the contrary, I implicitly
assume that searching is costly and that the consumer’s search behaviour is
characterized by his aspiration price (and, therefore, it is not necessarily opti-
mal), which is either endogenously determined by firms’ marketing decisions
or exogenously given.
The choice-theoretic foundations of the satisficing heuristic have been ex-
tensively studied. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) investigate a model in which
the decision-maker examines alternatives sequentially and stops searching as
soon as he identifies a satisfactory alternative. If he does not find any, he
chooses the last available option. On the other hand, Caplin and Dean
(2011) examine a model of sequential search in which the choice-process data
technique is utilized, according to which not only final choices, but also inter-
mediate ones are taken into account.10 While in these studies the consumer’s
10Other studies are Horan (2010) and Papi (2012).
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aspiration level is inferred from choices, in my paper it is determined by firms
decisions.
Finally, this paper is related to the experimental literature on satisficing.
Caplin, Dean and Martin (2011) test Caplin and Dean (2011) by implement-
ing experimentally choice process data. On the other hand, Reutskaja et al.
(2011) test subjects decisions on snack items under time pressure by using
eye-tracking. Both studies provide evidence that subjects behaviour is con-
sistent with the satisficing heuristic.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the formal model; Section 3 discusses several aspiration-price functions; Sec-
tion 4 presents the equilibrium analysis; Section 5 illustrates the comparative
statics analysis; Section 6 concludes by discussing limitations and extensions.
All proofs are relegated in the appendix.
2 The Model
I assume that there are two profit-maximizing firms that produce a homo-
geneous good at zero costs. Each firm simultaneously chooses a price in
the interval [0, 1] and decides whether to send out either a low (s = 0) or
a high (s = 1) marketing signal. Formally, a firm strategy is denoted by
(p, s) ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1}.
Marketing is interpreted as persuasive in the sense that it is aimed at
affecting the consumer’s aspiration price. As illustrated in the introduction,
an example is publicizing statements about the availability of the products.
If the consumer is told that there are few products left in store, then his as-
piration price is likely to increase. That is, he is less willing to postpone the
purchase and continue the search process even if the inspected firm charges
a relatively high price, as he is afraid that by waiting and visiting the com-
petitors the stores will run out of products. On the contrary, if he is told
that provisions are substantial, his aspiration price is likely to decrease.
I assume that there is one consumer assigned to firm 1 and firm 2 with
equal probability.11 That is, I assume two equally likely states of the world:
11An equivalent interpretation is that there is a unit mass of consumers, half of which
are assigned to firm 1 and half to firm 2.
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one in which the consumer’s default is firm 1 and one in which it is firm
2. His maximum willingness to pay for the product is normalized to one.
The consumer is satisficing in the sense that he inspects the price of the
firm he is assigned to. If it is satisfactory, then he stops searching, otherwise
he explores the other firm. Once that the consumer stops, he buys the
cheapest product discovered (i.e., search is with perfect recall). I assume
that the consumer’s aspiration price is determined by the marketing signals.
Let a(s1, s2) : {0, 1}2 → ∆[0, 1] denote the consumer’s aspiration-price
function. The interpretation is that a(s1, s1) is the consumer’s aspiration
price when firm 1 sends out signal s1 and firm 2 signal s2. I allow for the
possibility of a stochastic aspiration price by assuming that the aspiration-
price function maps the set of profiles of marketing signals into the set of
probability distributions over the unit interval.
The timing of the model is as follows. In period 0 firms choose a price
and a marketing signal; in period 1 the consumer is subject to the marketing
signals and his aspiration price is formed; in period 2 the consumer makes
his own searching and purchasing decisions.
Firm i’s profit function is as follows. Denote by a˜(s1, s2) the (ex-ante
unknown) realized aspiration price of the distribution a(s1, s2).
pii((pi, si), (pj, sj)) ≡

pi if pi < pj and pj > a˜(s1, s2)
pi
2
if pi = pj or pi, pj ≤ a˜(s1, s2)
0 otherwise
Firm i gets all market shares (pi) with probability one whenever it is
cheaper than firm j (pi < pj) and firm j’s price is unsatisfactory (pj >
a˜(s1, s2)). The latter implies that in the state of the world in which the
consumer is assigned to firm j, he realizes that the default firm charges an
unsatisfactory price, inspects firm i, and finds out that it is cheaper. On
the other hand, firms obtain all market shares with equal probability (pi
2
)
whenever they either charge the same price (pi = pj) or a satisfactory one
(pi, pj ≤ a˜(s1, s2)). If both firms charge a satisfactory price, then there is no
search and the consumer sticks to his default firm in all states of the world.
Finally, in all the other cases, firm i gets zero market shares (0).
Without imposing any structure on the aspiration-price function the model
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has little content. In the next section I discuss several examples of promi-
nent functions. Throughout the analysis I restrict my attention to symmetric
equilibria.
3 Examples of Aspiration-Price Functions
Example 1 (Bertrand (1883)). Let a(s1, s2) ≡ k with probability 1 for any
(s1, s2) for some k ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting model collapses into a Bertrand
competition setting where the minimum price charged is k. Hence, in the
unique symmetric equilibrium, firms set the price at k and marketing is ir-
relevant.
Example 2 (Ignoring the high/low marketing signal). Assume that a(s1, s2) ≡
min{s1, s2} with probability 1. That is, the consumer’s aspiration price is
always equal to the minimum of the two marketing signals. This aspiration-
price function induces a result identical to the one produced by standard
Bertrand, as in the unique symmetric equilibrium firms set the price at zero
and send out a low signal and the consumer’s welfare is maximized.
On the other hand, if a(s1, s2) ≡ max{s1, s2} with probability 1, then the
consumer considers only the highest of the two marketing signals. In the
unique symmetric equilibrium, firms set the price at one and send out a high
signal and the consumer’s welfare is minimized.
Example 3 (Shoppers-Uninformed Consumers (Varian, 1980)). Let q ∈
(0, 1). For any (s1, s2), let
a(s1, s2) ≡ 1 with probability q and 0 otherwise
This aspiration-price function generates an exogenous probability distri-
bution over ‘extreme’ aspiration prices (either zero or one). This implies that
with probability 1 − q the consumer makes a price comparison and buys the
cheapest product (shoppers) and with probability q he sticks to the default
independently of the price it charges (uninformed).
Example 4 (Limited Comparability (Piccione and Spiegler, 2012)12). Let
q0, q1, q ∈ (0, 1). Define
12See also Chiovenau and Zhou (2013).
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a(s1, s2) ≡

1 with probability q0 and 0 otherwise if s1 = s2 = 0
1 with probability q1 and 0 otherwise if s1 = s2 = 1
1 with probability q and 0 otherwise otherwise
A limited-comparability aspiration-price function extends Varian (1980)
by assuming that the probability distribution over ‘extreme’ aspiration prices
is determined by the marketing signals. In Piccione and Spiegler (2012)’s
terms marketing signals - called ‘frames’ - induce comparison probabilities
across products.
As just shown both Varian (1980) and Piccione and Spiegler (2012) can
be defined in terms of my model by assuming that consumers can have only
extreme aspiration prices. That is, they are either shoppers or uninformed
and whether or not they make a price comparison is independent of the prices
charged by firms. On the contrary, I propose a more general aspiration-price
function in the sense that it induces - besides shoppers and uninformed - an
additional type of consumers that I call conditional shopper. Conditional
shoppers stick to the default firm only if it charges a price smaller than or
equal to some intermediate aspiration price α ∈ (0, 1). I now define what I
call convex-combination aspiration-price function.
Let (s1, s2) be a pair of marketing signals. Denote by s¯(s1, s2) and s(s1, s2)
the highest and the lowest marketing signals, respectively. Formally,
s¯(s1, s2) ≡
{
max{s1, s2} if s1 6= s2
s1 otherwise
and s(s1, s2) ∈ {s1, s2} \ {s¯}.
The consumer’s aspiration price is a convex combination of s¯ and s. For-
mally, a(s1, s2) ≡ αs¯(s1, s2) + (1 − α)s(s1, s2) with probability 1 for some
α ∈ (0, 1), where α is an exogenous parameter that measures the consumer’s
propensity to stop searching, as a higher (resp., lower ) α weakly increases
(resp., decreases) the consumer’s aspiration price.
The interpretation is that the consumer receives the marketing signals
from both firms prior to starting the search process and forms an aspira-
tion price by combining the high and the low signal through a more or less
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conscious process. The convex-combination aspiration price function encom-
passes a sort of compromise effect, in the sense that when firms send out
conflicting signals, the consumer’s aspiration price becomes a compromise
between the two.13 This assumption is plausible and consistent with the
example provided above that marketing signals contain product availabil-
ity messages. E.g. if both firms publicize the fact that their provisions
of PlayStation are limited (resp., substantial), then the consumer’s aspira-
tion price is likely to increases (resp., decrease). If one firm announces that
PlayStation are running out of stock and the other the opposite, the aspira-
tion price is intermediate.14
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Endogenous Aspiration Prices
This subsection focuses on the convex-combination aspiration-price function.
Since the convex-combination aspiration-price function is deterministic, I
slightly abuse notation by denoting the ‘realized’ aspiration price by a(s1, s2)
throughout this subsection.
I begin with a preliminary observation.
Remark 1. The game that models the market under consideration does not
have pure-strategy equilibria.15
If both firms choose s = 0, the consumer is a shopper and firms have
an incentive to reduce the price to zero by standard Bertrand arguments.
13The idea that decision-makers compromise when faced with conflicting alternatives
is not new in psychology. The so-called compromise effect is for example discussed in
Simonson (1989) in the context of choice problems with multi-attribute alternatives.
14Notice that all aspiration-price functions I have discussed satisfy the property that
a(s1, s2) = a(s2, s1). This restriction applied to the convex-combination case implies that
the consumer’s aspiration price is α when firms send out different signals regardless of
whether the default firms sends out a high signal and the competitor sends out a low signal
or the other way around. In terms of the product-availability example this assumption
makes sense, because in either case the consumer faces a tradeoff between the risk of
failing to find a PlayStation in a given store and the possibility of paying it too much.
The tradeoff is resolved by a compromise via the formation of an intermediate aspiration
price.
15In fact it does not possess asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria either.
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However, choosing (p, s) = (0, 0) is not an equilibrium, because each firm i
has an incentive to deviate to (α, 1). The reason is that at the deviation the
consumer is a conditional shopper and, in the state of the world in which
the consumer is assigned to firm i, he finds firm i’s price satisfactory. This
implies that he does not inspect firm j and buys firm i’s product. Hence,
firm i makes α
2
> 0 profits. On the other hand, if both firms choose s = 1,
the consumer does not search, as he is an uninformed, and firms have an
incentive to raise the price to one. At (p, s) = (1, 1), firms make 1
2
profits.
However, (1, 1) is not an equilibrium either, because each firm i can profitably
deviate by reducing the consumer’s aspiration price to α (by choosing s = 0)
and charging a price  > 0 smaller than 1. In this way firm i ensures that
the consumer finds the price charged by both firms unsatisfactory and buys
firm i’s product with probability one, as it is cheaper. At the deviation firm
i makes 1−  profits that are greater than 1
2
for a sufficiently small .
Remark 1 implies that firms randomize over both marketing signals and
price in equilibrium. Throughout the analysis I denote a symmetric mixed-
strategy by σ ≡ 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉, where λ(s) is the probability that the
marketing signal s is sent out and F s is the cdf pricing strategy conditional
on the firm sending out signal s.
As an illustration assume that a firm i chooses the pure strategy (p, s) =
(p, 0) with p ≤ α against the other firm choosing some mixed strategy σ.16
Then, firm i’s profits are
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
{
λ(0)[1− F 0(p)] + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
]}
(1)
The interpretation is that with probability λ(0) firm j sends out a low
signal making the consumer’s aspiration price equal to a(0, 0) = 0. In this
case the consumer makes a price comparison with probability 1 and buys
from firm i whenever it is cheaper than firm j, which occurs with probability
1−F 0(p). On the other hand, whenever firm j sends out a high signal, which
occurs with probability λ(1), the consumer is a conditional shopper. Since
the price that firm i charges is lower than α, then in the state of the world
16For the sake of the illustration, I assume that F 0 is atomless. This assumption turns
out to hold in equilibrium.
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in which the consumer is assigned to firm i (which occurs with probability
1
2
), he stops searching at firm i and buys from it, as its price is satisfactory.
On the contrary, in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned
to firm j, he inspects firm i only if the price that firm j charges is greater
than α. Whenever the consumer does so, he buys from firm i, because while
the price that firm j charges is unsatisfactory, the price that firm i charges
is not. The latter occurs with probability 1−F
1(α)
2
. So overall firm i’s profits
are given by the price p it charges times the probability that the consumer
buys firm i’s product.
Remark 2. The max-min payoff of the game that models the market under
consideration is α
2
.
Assume that a firm i chooses (p, s) = (α, 1). Independently of how the
other firm responds, the consumer’s aspiration price is either α (if firm j
chooses s = 0) or 1 (if firm j chooses s = 1). Hence, by charging at most α,
firm i ensures that in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned
to it, he will stop searching at firm i and buy its product. This implies that
firm i makes at least α
2
profits. Firm i can possibly make higher profits in the
case firm j charges an unsatisfactory price with some probability, but this
will not happen under the max-min assumption. It follows that the unique
max-minimizer is (α, 1) and the corresponding max-min payoff is α
2
.
Remark 2 has got strong implications on the equilibrium analysis. In par-
ticular it entails that the minimum level of profits that a firm can guarantee
in equilibrium is positive and equal to α
2
.
The equilibrium pricing and marketing strategies turn out to be different
depending on whether α is greater or smaller than a threshold. I examine
the two cases separately.
Theorem 1 (α < 2
3
). There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
firms send out a low marketing signal with probability 2−α
3α+2
and a high mar-
keting signal with probability 4α
3α+2
. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms
randomize over the price according to the following cdf F 0(p).
16
F 0(p) ≡

0 if p < α
1+α
2(1+α)
2−α − 2αp(2−α) if p ∈
[
α
1+α
, α
]
2α
2−α if p ∈
(
α, 2α
2−α
)
2+α
2−α − 2αp(2−α) if p ∈
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
1 otherwise
Conditional on sending a high signal, firms set the price at α and 1 with
equal probability.
According to theorem 1, conditional on sending out a low marketing sig-
nal, firms randomize over the price according to an atomless cdf. On the
contrary, conditional on sending out a high signal, firms charge two prices
- α and 1 - with positive probability. As one expects, the probability that
firms send out a high signal is increasing in the attention α that the consumer
devotes to the high signal. See figure 1 for a graphical representation of the
supports of F 0 and F 1 when α < 2
3
.
-
F 0
-
F 1
0
t
α
1+α
t
t
α
t
2α
2−α
d
t
1
Figure 1: The support of F 0 and F 1 when α < 2
3
An interesting feature of the above equilibrium is that the support of F 0
contains a gap located at the interval
(
α, 2α
2−α
)
. The reason is that, condi-
tional on sending out a low signal, by increasing the price from α to a price
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above α there is a discontinuity in the profits, as firms suddenly lose market
power. To gain an intuition of why this is the case I now compute a firm i’s
expected profits of choosing (p′, 0) with p′ > α against some mixed-strategy
σ.
pi((p′, 0), σ) = p′
{
λ(0)[1− F 0(p′)] + λ(1)[1− F 1(p′)]} (2)
By comparing the above expected profits (eq.(2)) with the expected prof-
its of choosing the strategy (p, 0) with p ≤ α (see eq. (1)), it can be seen
that there is a difference in the realization in which firm j sends out a high
signal. In particular as long as firm i charges a price at most equal to α, it
guarantees that in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned
to it, the conditional shopper stops searching at firm i, as its price is satis-
factory, regardless of the price charged by firm j. On the contrary, as soon as
firm i increases its price above α, it makes its price unsatisfactory implying
that in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned to firm i, the
conditional shopper will inspect firm j. For a sufficiently small  > 0, this
discontinuity in profits implies that an increase in the price from α to α + 
does not offset the reduction in market shares.
Unlike F 0, the equilibrium pricing cdf F 1 is ‘extreme’ in the sense that it
consists of two atoms located at α and 1 - the consumer’s aspiration prices
when a firm chooses s = 0 and the other s = 1. While the detailed proof
of why this is the case can be found in the appendix, here I provide just
an intuition by discussing three observations. First, conditional on sending
a high signal, it does not make sense for a firm to charge a price strictly
below α, because in the worst case (when the other firm chooses s = 0)
the consumer’s aspiration price is α. Hence, charging a price below α yields
the same market shares as charging α, but generates lower profits. This
implies that whenever a firm sends out a high signal, it never charges a price
below α. Second, as for F 0, increasing the price from α to a price above
α conditional on sending out a high signal reduces market power, because
the prices above α are unsatisfactory when firms send out different signals.
Third, conditional on sending a high signal, the market shares that a firm
obtains when the other firm sends out a high signal as well are independent
of the price that firm i charges. The reason is that when both firms send
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out a high signal the consumer is uninformed implying that he sticks to the
default regardless of the price they charge. This clearly incentivizes firms to
charge the highest possible price.
I now examine the second case.
Theorem 2 (α ≥ 2
3
). There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
firms send out a low marketing signal with probability 1−α and a high signal
with probability α. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms randomize over
the price according to the following cdf F 0(p).
F 0(p) ≡

0 if p < α
3−2α
3−2α
2(1−α) − α2(1−α)p if p ∈
[
α
3−2α , α
]
1 otherwise
Conditional on sending a high signal, firms set the price at α and 1 with
probability 2α−1
α
and 1−α
α
, respectively.
The main difference between the equilibrium strategies of theorem 1 and
those of theorem 2 is that, unlike in theorem 1, in theorem 2 the equilibrium
cdf F 0 assigns no mass to the prices above α. The intuition behind this
result can be gained by looking at figure 1. By increasing α, the gap in the
support of F 0 discussed above shifts to the right and, as a result, the right
portion of the support (i.e.,
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
) shrinks. As soon as α increases above
a certain threshold (i.e., 2
3
), the right portion of the support disappears. It
turns out that this ‘disappearance’ has a strong impact on the consumer’s
welfare, which I will discuss in the comparative statics section.
4.2 Exogenous Aspiration Prices
In this subsection I investigate the implications of assuming that firms cannot
manipulate aspiration prices. I assume that the consumer is endowed with an
exogenously given aspiration price prior to starting the search process, which
might be based for example on previous experience or on some unmodelled
expectation about the availability of the products.
Let ηa denote the probability that the consumer’s aspiration price is a ∈
{0, α, 1}, with α, ηa ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
a∈{0,α,1} ηa = 1. The resulting aspiration-
price function is defined as follows.
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a(s1, s2) ≡

0 with probability η0
α with probability ηα
1 otherwise
As in the case of endogenous aspiration prices, the game that models the
market under consideration does not have pure-strategy equilibria. Its max-
min payoff is equal to η1
2
- the fraction of uninformed consumers divided by
two - if α < η1
ηα+η1
and to α(ηα+η1)
2
- the fraction of conditional shoppers and
uninformed times α divided by two -, otherwise.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which firms
randomize over the price according to the following cdf F (p).
1. if α ≤ η1
2−η1 , then
F (p) ≡

0 if p < η1
2−η1
2−η1
2(1−η1) −
η1
2(1−η1)p if p ∈
[
η1
2−η1 , 1
]
1 otherwise
2. if α ∈
(
η1
2−η1 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
, then
F (p) ≡

0 if p < αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α
2η0(1+η0−η1)α −
η1
2η0p
if p ∈
[
αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α , α
]
2α−η1−η1α
(1+η0−η1)α if p ∈
[
α, (1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α
]
2−η1
2(1−η1) −
η1
2(1−η1)p if p ∈
[
(1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α , 1
]
1 otherwise
3. if α ≥ η1
ηα+η1
, then
F (p) ≡

0 if p < α(1−η0)
1+η0
η0+1
2η0
− α(1−η0)
2η0p
if p ∈
[
α(1−η0)
1+η0
, α
]
1 otherwise
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According to theorem 3 firms randomize over the price according to an
atomless cdf. The reason is because the positive probability that the con-
sumer is a shopper ensures that it is profitable to undercut any atom. The
support of the cdf depends on the value of α. If α is small, then the condi-
tional shopper becomes more and more similar to a shopper implying that
firms charge with positive probability prices in the interval [pL, 1], where
pL ∈ (α, 1). The resulting cdf is analogous to that of Varian (1980). If α is
intermediate, then the support of the equilibrium cdf contains a gap located
at (α, p˜), where p˜ ∈ (α, 1). The intuition is the same as that behind theorem
2. That is, by increasing in the price from α to a price slightly above α, firms
lose market shares, because the conditional shopper does not stop searching
anymore at the default. Since the increase in the price does not offset the loss
in market shares, firms assign zero mass to an above interval (α, p˜). Finally,
if α is greater than a certain threshold, then the gap mentioned above shifts
to the right implying that - if α is sufficiently high - the price interval (α, 1]
is assigned zero mass.
5 Comparative Statics
5.1 Consumer Types
The distribution of consumer types in equilibrium under endogenous aspi-
ration prices is induced by the marketing strategies. Denote by ηEnda the
endogenous probability that the consumer’s aspiration price is a ∈ {0, α, 1}.
Proposition 1 (Endogenous consumer type distribution). Under endoge-
nous aspiration prices, in equilibrium
ηEnd0 ≡
{
(2−α)2
(3α+2)2
if α < 2
3
(1− α)2 otherwise
ηEndα ≡
{
24α(2−α)
(3α+2)2
if α < 2
3
2α(1− α) otherwise
ηEnd1 ≡
{
16α2
(3α+2)2
if α < 2
3
α2 otherwise
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Figure 2 shows how the distribution of types varies as α changes. As
expected, when α is low almost the most frequent type is shopper, because
the consumer devotes little attention to the high marketing signal. As α
increases the probability of shoppers decreases and that of the uninformed
increases. When α is big the consumer is very likely to be uninformed.
Conditional shoppers are the most frequent types for intermediate values of
α.
Figure 2: Endogenous consumer type distribution against α
Note that the above consumer type distribution satisfies the inequality
α ≥ ηEnd1
ηEndα +η
End
1
. This implies that it is compatible with the third case of
theorem 3. I will later use this observation to compare the exogenous and
the endogenous aspiration-price equilibrium outcomes.
5.2 Profits
The choice behaviour of both the conditional shopper and uninformed con-
sumer is irrational from a revealed preference’s viewpoint regardless of whether
or not aspiration prices are manipulated by firms. To see why, assume that a
conditional shopper inspects firm 1 first and then firm 2. Assume that firm 1
charges  > 0 and firm 2 charges α−. In this case, as long as  is sufficiently
small, the consumer stops searching at firm 1, because it charges a satisfac-
tory price, and buys its product. Next, assume that firm 1 now charges α− 
and firm 2 charges . The consumer stops searching at firm 1 and buys its
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product, again because it charges a satisfactory price. This choice patter is
irrational as it involves a choice reversal. Since the consumer’s choice be-
haviour is irrational independently of whether or not aspiration prices are
endogenous, then it is not obvious a priori whether competitive forces are
able to prevent exploitation in either case.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium profits). Under endogenous aspiration prices,
equilibrium profits are
• 2α
3α+2
, if α < 2
3
• α
2
, otherwise.
Under exogenous aspiration prices, equilibrium profits are
• η1
2
, if α ≤ η1
η1+ηα
• α(η1+ηα)
2
, otherwise.
Proposition 2 contains two main messages. First, under endogenous as-
piration prices, firms profits increase with α in absolute value, but at the
same time are greater than the max-min payoff when α < 2
3
and equal to
it elsewhere (see figure 3). This implies that consumer’s exploitation - mea-
sured as the difference between firms profits and the max-min payoff - occurs
under endogenous aspiration prices only if α is sufficiently small. In par-
ticular the maximum degree of exploitation occurs for a value of α strictly
between zero and 1
2
as the next remark illustrates. Recall that α measures
the consumer’s propensity to stop searching meaning that a higher (resp.,
lower) α corresponds to a lower (resp., higher) propensity to search. This
result is surprising and hard to reconcile with a model of price competition
with rational consumers and homogeneous products, because intuitively one
is led to think that the lower the consumer’s propensity to search, the higher
the chances that the consumer gets exploited. On the contrary, under a high
α competitive forces successfully reduce firms profits to the max-min level.
In other words, if the consumer’s propensity to search is above (resp., below)
a certain threshold, then exploitation occurs (resp., does not occur). I will
discuss the intuition behind this finding later in this subsection.
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Remark 3. Under endogenous aspiration prices, in equilibrium the difference
between firms profits and the max-min payoff is maximized at α = 2
3
(
√
2 −
1) ' 0.28.17
Figure 3: Profits vs max-min payoff under endogenous aspiration prices
against α
Second, under exogenous aspiration prices, firms profits are equal to the
max-min payoff for any value of α. That is, despite the fact that the consumer
is irrational from a revealed preference’s viewpoint, competitive forces are
able to reduce firms profits to the constrained competitive level - the max-min
payoff - when firms cannot manipulate the aspiration prices. Therefore, firms
can successfully exploit consumers if and only if the consumer’s propensity
to search is sufficiently high and firms can manipulate the aspiration prices.
I now compare equilibrium profits under exogenous and endogenous aspi-
ration prices by assuming the endogenous distribution of consumer types re-
covered in proposition 1 (figure 4). Under the endogenous consumer type dis-
tribution, exogenous profits in equilibrium are 4α
2(α+2)
(3α+2)2
if α < 2
3
and α
2(2−α)
2
,
otherwise. Figure 4 suggests that the fact that firms can manipulate aspira-
tion prices clearly makes consumers worse off, as profits under endogenous
17The relevant case is when α < 23 . By proposition 2, the difference between firms
profits and max-min is given by 2α3α+2 − α2 . The FOC is −9α
2−12α+4
2(3α+2)2 = 0, which implies
that α = 23 (
√
2 − 1). The SOC is satisfied, as the second derivative − 24(3α+2)3 is always
negative for a positive α.
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aspiration prices are greater than those under exogenous aspiration prices for
any value of α.
Figure 4: Equilibrium profits under endogenous and exogenous aspiration
prices (by assuming the consumer type distribution of proposition 1) against
α
The findings of this subsection have implications for policy. First, in or-
der to prevent exploitation policy-makers should focus their attention on the
regulation of marketing campaigns in order to prevent firms from manipu-
lating the consumer’s willingness to search through advertising, because that
makes consumers worse off. Second, in case policy-makers are not able to
prevent firms from manipulating the aspiration prices, then they should not
incentivize an increase in the consumer’s propensity to search, because this
may lead to exploitation.
The remainder of this subsection discusses the reason for which firms
profits in equilibrium are greater than the max-min only if α < 2
3
under
endogenous aspiration prices. As anticipated the intuition behind this sur-
prising result is linked with the structure of the support of the equilibrium
cdf F 0 (see theorem 1). I now compute the expected profits of choosing the
max-minimizer (α, 1) against the equilibrium mixed-strategy σ.
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
{
λ(0)
[
1
2
+
1− F 0(α)
2
]
+
λ(1)
2
}
Notice that pi((α, 1), σ) is equal to the max-min payoff α
2
if and only if
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F 0(α) = 1. However, in equilibrium, when α < 2
3
, the probability that firms
charge prices below α conditional on sending out a low signal is less than
one, because F 0 assigns positive mass to an interval above α (i.e.,
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
)
implying that firms make higher profits than the max-min payoff. On the
contrary, when α ≥ 2
3
, F 0(α) = 1 and expected profits are equal to the max-
min payoff. The implication of this observation is that the source of extra
profits is given by the fact that when α is small, conditional on choosing
s = 0, firms charge prices greater than α that do not meet any consumer’s
aspiration price (neither 0 nor α). In other words, exploitation is given by
the fact that firms charge prices that are never satisfactory conditional on
sending out a low signal.
5.3 Consumer Search Behaviour
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium probability that only one firm is inspected).
Under endogenous aspiration prices, the equilibrium probability that only one
firm is inspected is
• 2α(11α+2)
(3α+2)2
, if α < 2
3
• −2α2 + 4α− 1, if α ≥ 2
3
Under exogenous aspiration prices, the equilibrium probability that only
one firm is inspected is
• η1, if α ≤ η12−η1
• η1 + (1− η0 − η1)2α−η1−η1α1+η0−ηα , if α ∈
(
η1
2−η1 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
• 1− η0, if α ≥ η1ηα+η1
Figure 5 compares the equilibrium probability that only one firm is in-
spected under exogenous and endogenous aspiration prices by assuming the
endogenous consumer type distribution recovered in proposition 1. Under
the endogenous consumer type distribution, the exogenous equilibrium prob-
ability that only one firm is inspected is equal to 1 − (2−α)2
(3α+2)2
if α < 2
3
and
equal to 1 − (1 − α)2, otherwise. By looking at figure 5, one can see that
the probability that only one firm is inspected is increasing with α under
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both endogenous and exogenous aspiration prices. However, the probability
that one firm is inspected is higher under exogenous aspiration prices for
any value of α. That is, the consumer searches more under endogenous than
under exogenous aspiration prices. Given that firms profits are higher under
endogenous than under exogenous aspiration prices, this may seem odd at
first. However, the reason is that less stopping is a consequence of the fact
that firms charge relatively higher (unsatisfactory) prices and more stopping
is a consequence of the fact that firms charge relatively lower (satisfactory)
prices. Since higher prices correspond to higher profits, then this in turn im-
plies that less (resp., more) stopping leads to higher (resp., lower) profits.18
Figure 5: Probability that only one firm is inspected under endogenous and
exogenous aspiration prices (by assuming the consumer type distribution of
proposition 1) against α
5.4 Switching Rates
The switching rate is the probability that the consumer switches away from
the default firm by purchasing from the competitor.
Proposition 4 (Switching Rates). Under endogenous aspiration prices, the
equilibrium switching rates are
18It can be shown that the average equilibrium price charged under endogenous aspira-
tion prices is greater than that under exogenous aspiration prices for any value of α.
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• −15α2+12α+4
2(3α+2)2
, if α < 2
3
• 3
2
(1− α)2, if α ≥ 2
3
Under exogenous aspiration prices, the equilibrium switching rates are
1. 1−η1
2
, if α ≤ η0
2−η0
2.
η21(η0α
2−2α−1)+η1{2αη1[2−α(η20+2η0−1)]}+α2(η30+3η20+3η0−3)
2α2(1+η0−η1) , if α ∈
(
η0
2−η0 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
3. η0
2
, if α ≥ η1
ηα+η1
Figure 6: Switching rates under endogenous and exogenous aspiration prices
(by assuming the consumer type distribution of proposition 1) against α
Figure 6 shows the switching rates under exogenous and endogenous as-
piration prices by assuming the endogenous consumer type distribution of
proposition 1. Under the endogenous consumer type distribution, the ex-
ogenous switching rate becomes (2−α)
2
2(3α+2)2
when α < 2
3
and (1−α)
2
2
, otherwise.
Figure 6 suggests that the switching rates are greater under endogenous than
under exogenous aspiration prices for any value of α. This finding is con-
sistent with that of the previous subsection. That is, relatively more (resp.,
less) switching is associated with firms charging relatively more unsatisfac-
tory (resp., satisfactory) prices.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper adds a substantial contribution to the behavioural industrial or-
ganization literature by studying the effects of the consumer being satisfic-
ing in a market populated by profit-maximizing firms. In particular, unlike
the existing market models of price competition with homogeneous products
(Carlin, 2009; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chiovenau and Zhou, 2013), my
framework assumes that the consumer’s decision of whether to continue the
search process depends upon both an aspiration price, which is influenced by
the marketing decisions, and the pricing decisions made by firms.
This work provides a set of novel results that have relevant implications
for policy. First, it shows that exploitation does not occur when firms are
not able to influence the consumer’s aspiration price. This result is non-
obvious, because the consumer’s choice behaviour is irrational from a revealed
preference’s viewpoint regardless of whether or not firms are able to affect
his aspiration price. Moreover, firms make higher profits when they can
manipulate the aspiration prices. Second, in the case in which firms can
manipulate the consumer’s aspiration price, exploitation is prevented if and
only if the consumer’s propensity to search is sufficiently low. This finding is
hard to reconcile with a model of price competition with rational consumers
and homogeneous products.
The policy implications are two-fold. First, policy-makers should focus
their attention on the regulation of marketing campaigns in order to prevent
firms from manipulating the consumers’ search behaviour. Second, in case
policy-makers are unable to it, they should not incentivize an increase in the
consumer’s propensity to search, as this may lead to exploitation.
Below I acknowledge the main limitations of the model and outline possi-
ble extensions. First, even though the ex-post equilibrium aspiration price is
stochastic, I assume the aspiration-price function to be deterministic under
endogenous aspiration prices and, as a result, do not investigate whether re-
sults are robust to heterogeneity in the consumer’s aspiration price. Different
consumers might form different aspiration prices when subject to the same
marketing signals. An interesting exercise to address this point would be to
enrich the current analysis by assuming a stochastic aspiration-price function
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under endogenous aspiration prices.
Second, another extension would be to assume that the consumer up-
dates his aspiration price (upwards or downwards) during the search process
depending on the prices he sequentially discovers. This challenging modifi-
cation would make the model closer to the original idea by Herbert Simon.
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A Proofs of theorems
Proof of theorem 1. Assume that α < 2
3
. Let σ = 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉
denote a symmetric equilibrium (mixed-) strategy. Denote by psL and p
s
H the
infimum and the supremum of the support of F s. I prove the statement in a
series of steps.
Step 1: p0L > 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, choosing (0, 0) yields zero profits. However,
choosing the max-minimizer (α, 1) with probability one yields positive prof-
its. Hence, a firm can profitably deviate, which leads to a contradiction.
Step 2: p1L ≥ α.
Proof. Assume that a firm chooses s = 1. Then, the consumer’s induced
aspiration price is either α or 1. Hence, charging a price strictly below
α yields the same market shares as charging the price at least at α, but
generates lower profits. Hence, each firm never sets a price strictly below α
whenever it chooses s = 1.
Step 3: F 0 is atomless.
Proof. By step 1, p0H > 0. Assume, by contradiction, that F
0 has an atom
of size A > 0 at p ∈ (0, 1]. Suppose first that p ≤ α. Then, choosing (p, 0)
against σ yields p
{
λ(0)
(
1− F 0(p) + A
2
)
+ λ(1)
(
1
2
+ 1−F (α)
2
)}
. Assume that
firm i deviates to p−. The deviation yields (p−) {λ(0) (1− F 0(p− ) +A+
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ 1−F (α)
2
)
. Note that for a sufficiently small  the deviation is prof-
itable. Next, assume that p > α. Then, pi((p, 0), σ) = p
{
λ(0)
(
1− F 0(p) + A
2
)
+
λ(1) (1− F 1(p)). Assume that firm i deviates to p− . This deviation yields
(p − ) {λ(0) (1− F 0(p− ) + A) + λ(1) (1− F 1(p− ))}. Note that for a
sufficiently small  the deviation is profitable. Hence, F 0 is atomless.
Step 4: p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
Proof. I first show that p0H ≥ α. Suppose not. Hence, p0H < α. Then,
choosing (p0H , 0) against σ yields p
0
H
{
λ(1)
[
1
2
+ A
2
]}
, as, by step 2, p1L ≥ α,
where A is the probability that p1 is strictly greater than α. Assume that firm
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i deviates to (α, 0). This deviation yields α
{
λ(1)
[
1
2
+ A
2
]}
and is profitable
if and only if p0H < α, which is true by assumption, a contradiction.
Next, suppose, by contradiction, that p0H ∈ (α, 1). Note that choosing
(p0H , 1) yields p
0
H
{
λ(1)
2
}
. However, deviating to (1, 1) is profitable, as this
strategy yields λ(1)
2
. This implies that the interval [p0H , 1) cannot be in the
support of F 1. Note that (p0H , 0) yields p
0
H {λ(1)B}, where B is the proba-
bility that p0H is less than p
1. Assume that a firm deviates to (p′, 0), where
p′ ∈ (p0H , 1). The deviation yields p′ {λ(1)B}, as the interval [p0H , 1) is not in
the support of F 1, and is profitable, as p′ > p0H . However, this contradicts
the fact that p0H is the highest price in the support of F
0.
Hence, it must be that p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
In the reminder of the proof I assume that p0H = 1. I will consider the
p0H = α case in theorem 2.
Step 5: F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
, p0H = 1 is not included in the
support of F 0, and firms profits are λ(1)
2
.
Proof. By step 4, p0H = 1 is the supremum. Assume, by contradiction, that
F 1 does not have an atom at p = 1. But then, pi((1, 0), σ) = 0. However,
choosing the max-minimizer (α, 1) with probability one yields strictly pos-
itive profits, a contradiction. Hence, F 1 does have an atom at p = 1 and
choosing (1, 1) against σ yields λ(1)
2
. Assume that the size of the atom is
A > 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that p0H = 1 is included in the support
of F 0. Then, choosing (1, 0) against σ yields λ(1)A
2
. Assume that a firm
deviates to 1 −  conditional on advertising s = 0. This deviation yields
(1 − ) {λ(0) [1− F 0(1− )] + λ(1) [A+ (1− F 1(1− ))]}. For a sufficiently
small  the deviation is profitable. Hence, p0H = 1 is not the greatest element
of the support of F 1. However, note that limp→−1 pi((p, 0), σ) = λ(1)A. Since
pi((1, 1), σ) = λ(1)
2
, then, by equating these two and solving for A, A = 1
2
.
Step 6: p1L > p
0
L.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Suppose first that p1L < p
0
L. Then, pi((p
1
L, 1), σ) =
p1L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
. Assume that a firm deviates to (p0L, 1). By step 3, F
0
is atomless. Hence, the deviation yields p0L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
, which is strictly
greater than pi((p1L, 1), σ), a contradiction. Next, assume that p
1
L = p
0
L = p.
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Step 2 rules out the possibility that p < α. Hence, assume that p ≥ α. I
distinguish two cases.
Case (i): F 1 has an atom at p = p¯. Let B > 0 denote the size of
this atom. By step 5, B is at most 1
2
. Assume first that p = α. Then,
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+ (1−B)
2
])
and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
.
These two profits are the same if and only if B = 1, a contradiction. Next,
assume that p > α. Note that pi((p, 0), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
B
2
+ (1−B)]),
as F 1 has an atom at p¯, and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
. These two profits
are the same if and only if B = 1, a contradiction.
Case (ii): F 1 does not have an atom at p = p. Then, pi((p, 0), σ) = p
and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
independently of whether p is equal to or
strictly greater than α. Note that these two profits are different, a contra-
diction.
Step 7: p1L = α and p
0
L < α.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that p1L > α. I distinguish two cases.
Case (i): p1L belongs to the support of F
0. Assume first that F 1 does not
have an atom at p1L. Note that pi((p
1
L, 1), σ) = p
1
L
(
λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)2
)
and pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)). These two payoffs differ, a
contradiction. Next, assume that F 1 does have an atom at p1L of size G. Note
that pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L
(
λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)
(
G
2
+ 1−G)). However, de-
viating to (p1L− , 0) is profitable as long as  is sufficiently small, as it yields
pi((p1L − , 0), σ) = (p1L − ) (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L − )] + λ(1)), a contradiction.
Case (ii): p1L does not belong to the support of F
0. Then there exists
an interval (p, p¯) ⊂ (0, 1) such that p1L ∈ (p, p¯) for which F 0 is flat. Notice
that pi((p, 0), σ) = p [λ(0)(1− F 0(p¯)) + λ(1)]. Assume first that F 1 does not
have an atom at p1L. Then, deviating to (p
1
L, 0) is profitable, as it yields
pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L [λ(0)(1− F 0(p¯)) + λ(1)] > pi((p, 0), σ), a contradiction.
Next, assume that F 1 does have an atom at p1L of size G. Deviating to (p
1
L−
, 0) is profitable as long as  is sufficiently small, as it yields pi((p1L−, 0), σ) =
(p1L − ) (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L − )] + λ(1)) > pi((p, 0), σ), a contradiction.
Hence, it must be that p1L = α. By step 6, p
0
L < α.
Step 8: F 1 is flat over the interval (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small 
and has an atom at α.
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Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that F 1 is strictly increasing over the inter-
val (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small . But then, pi ((α, 1) , σ) = α
[
λ(0)
(
1
2
+
1−F 0(α)
2
)
+ λ(1)
2
and pi ((α + , 1) , σ) = (α + )
[
λ(0) (1− F (α + )) + λ(1)
2
]
.
For any sufficiently small , pi ((α, 1) , σ) > pi ((α + , 1) , σ), a contradiction.
Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small . By
step 7, α belongs to the support of F 1. Hence, F 1 has an atom at α.
Step 9: F 0 is constant over the interval
(
α, p
)
, for some p < 1.
Proof. Suppose not. By step 8, F 1 has an atom at p = α. Let D > 0
denote the size of this atom. Note that pi ((α, 0) , σ) = α (λ(0) [1− F 0 (α)]
+λ(1)
[
1
2
+ 1
2
(1−D)] and pi ((α + , 0) , σ) = (α + ) (λ(0) [1− F 0 (α + )]
+λ(1) [1− F 1 (α + )]. As long as  is sufficiently small, the first payoff is
greater than the second, a contradiction.
Step 10: F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval [p0L, α] and over the
interval
(
p, 1
)
with p ∈ (α, 1).
Proof. By the previous steps, p0L < α and ∃ an interval (α, p) over which F 0 is
flat for some p ∈ (α, 1). I first show that F 0 is strictly increasing over the in-
terval [p0L, α]. Suppose not. Hence, assume that there is an interval (p
′, p′′) ⊆
[p0L, α] over which F
0 is constant. By step 2, F 1 assigns zero mass to the inter-
val [p0L, α). Note that pi((p
′, 0), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
C
])
,
where C is the probability that F 1 assigns to the prices strictly above α.
On the other hand, pi((p′′, 0), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
C
])
.
The latter is greater than the former, a contradiction. Hence, F 0 is strictly
increasing over the interval [p0L, α].
Next, I show that F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval
(
p, 1
)
for
some p ∈ (α, 1). Suppose not. Then, there is an interval (p′, p′′) ⊆ (p, 1)
over which F 0 is flat. I first show that F 1 assigns no mass to this interval.
The reason is that pi((p′, 1), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1)
2
)
is strictly less
than pi((p′′, 1), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1)
2
)
. Since F 1 assigns no mass
to the interval (p′, p′′), then for the same reasons pi((p′, 0), σ) < pi((p′′, 0),
a contradiction. Hence, F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval
(
p, 1
)
for
some p ∈ (α, 1).
Step 11: F 1 consists of two atoms of size 1
2
each located at p = α and
p = 1.
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Proof. By the previous steps, F 0 is strictly increasing over the intervals [p0L, α]
and
[
p, 1
)
for some p ∈ (α, 1). Moreover, F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
and an atom at p = α. Denote the size of the latter by D > 0.
As shown in step 10, if F 0 is flat over an interval above α, then F 1 must
be flat as well over the same interval. Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval
(α, p). Assume, by contradiction, that F 1 is strictly increasing over some
subset of the interval
[
p, 1
)
. Denote by p, p′ two distinct prices in this inter-
val such that p < p′. Then, pi ((p, 1) , σ) = p
(
λ(0) [1− F 0 (p)] + λ(1)
2
)
and
pi ((p, 0) , σ) = p (λ(0) [1− F 0 (p)] + λ(1)[1− F 1(p)]). By equating these two,
1−F 1(p) = 1
2
. Next, notice that pi ((p′, 1) , σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0 (p′)] + λ(1)
2
)
and pi ((p′, 0) , σ) = p′ (λ(0) [1− F 0 (p′)] + λ(1)(1− F 1(p′)). By equating these
two, 1 − F 1(p′) = 1
2
. But then 1 − F 1(p) = 1 − F 1(p′) = 1
2
, which leads to
a contradiction. Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval (α, 1). By step 5, F 1 has
an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
. Hence, the size of the atom at p = α is 1
2
as
well.
Step 12: the support of F 0 is given by the union of the intervals
[
α
1+α
, α
]
and
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
, λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
, and firms profits are 2α
3α+2
.
Proof. By the previous steps, F 0 is strictly increasing over the intervals [p0L, α]
and
[
p, 1
)
for some p ∈ (α, 1). Moreover, F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
and an atom at p = α of size 1
2
. Next, let B ≡ F 0 (α). Note the following.
pi
((
p0L, 0
)
, σ
)
= p0L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
])
(3)
pi ((α, 0) , σ) = α
(
λ(0)(1−B) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
])
(4)
pi
((
p, 0
)
, σ
)
= p
(
λ(0)(1−B) + λ(1)
2
)
(5)
pi ((α, 1) , σ) = α
(
λ(0)
[
1
2
+
1−B
2
]
+
λ(1)
2
)
(6)
pi ((1, 1) , σ) =
λ(1)
2
(7)
By equating equations 6 and 7 and solving for B, B = 2αλ(0)−λ(1)(1−α)
αλ(0)
.
Next, by equating equations 4 and 7 and solving for λ(1), λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
. Hence,
firms profits in equilibrium are 2α
3α+2
and B = 2α
2−α . By equating equations 3
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and 7, p0L =
α
1+α
. Finally, by equating equations 5 and 7, p = 2α
2−α . Notice
that the support of F 0 is well-defined as long as α < 2
3
, which holds by
assumption.
Step 13: F 0 is defined as in the statement of theorem 1.
Proof. By step 12, the support of F 0 is given by the union of the inter-
vals
[
α
1+α
, α
]
and
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
, λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
, and firms profits are 2α
3α+2
. The
expected profits of choosing (p, 0) such that p ∈ [ α
1+α
, α
]
against σ are
given by p
(
2−α
3α+2
(1− F 0(p)) + 4α
3α+2
[
1
2
+ 1
2
1
2
])
= 2α
3α+2
. By solving for F 0(p),
F 0(p) = 2(1+α)
2−α − 2αp(2−α) .
Next, the expected profits of choosing (p, 0) such that p ∈ [ 2α
2−α , 1
)
against
σ are given by p
(
2−α
3α+2
(1− F 0(p)) + 4α
3α+2
1
2
)
= 2α
3α+2
. By solving for F 0(p),
F 0(p) = 2+α
2−α − 2αp(2−α) , as desired.
Step 14: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. By step 12, firms equilibrium profits are 2α
3α+2
. I now check for prof-
itable deviations. I distinguish six sets of deviations.
• Case (i): to (p, 0) such that p < α
1+α
. The deviation yields
p
(
2− α
3α + 2
+
4α
3α + 2
(
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
))
and is profitable if and only if p > α
1+α
, a contradiction.
• Case (ii): to (p, 0) such that p ∈ (α, 2α
2+α
)
. The deviation yields
p
[
2− α
3α + 2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > 2α
2−α , a contradiction.
• Case (iii): to (1, 0). The deviation yields 4α
3α+2
1
2
1
2
and is profitable if
and only if 1 > 2, a contradiction.
• Case (iv): to (p, 1) such that p < α. The deviation yields
p
{
2− α
3α + 2
[
1
2
+
1
2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)]
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
}
and is profitable if and only if p > α, a contradiction.
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• Case (v): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ (α, 2α
2−α
)
. The deviation yields
p
[
2− α
3α + 2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > 2α
2−α , a contradiction.
• Case (vi): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ [ 2α
2+α
, 1
)
. The deviation yields
p
{
2− α
3α + 2
[
1−
(
2 + α
2− α −
2α
p(2− α)
)]
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
}
and is profitable if and only if 1 > 1, a contradiction.
There are no profitable deviations.
Hence, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof of theorem 2. Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. Let σ = 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉
denote a symmetric equilibrium (mixed-) strategy. As before denote by psL
and psH the infimum and the supremum of the support of F
s. The first four
steps (p0L > 0, p
1
L ≥ α, F 0 is atomless, and p0H ∈ {α, 1}) are analogous to
those of the previous theorem and therefore I omit their proof. Throughout
I assume that p0H = α.
19
Step 5: F 1 consists of an atom at p = α and an atom at p = 1 of size
2α−1
α
and 1−α
α
, respectively and firms profits are λ(1)
2
.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that some p ∈ (α, 1) is in the support of
F 1. Then, pi((p, 1), σ) = pλ(1)
2
. But then each firm has an incentive to deviate
to (1, 1), as this yields λ(1)
2
. Hence, the prices in the interval (α, 1) are not
in the support of F 1. Next, suppose, by contradiction, that F 1 does not
have an atom at p = 1. This implies that F 1 has an atom at α of size 1.
Then, pi((α, 0), σ) = αλ(1)
2
. However, each firm has an incentive to deviate
to (1, 1), as this yields λ(1)
2
. Hence, F 1 has an atom at p = 1. This implies
that firms profits in equilibrium are given by λ(1)
2
= pi((1, 1), σ). Notice that
pi((α, 0), σ) = α
[
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ A
2
)]
, where A is the probability that F 1 assigns
19The p0H = 1 case is examined in theorem 1.
37
to the atom at p = 1. Since (α, 0) is part of the support, then it must yield
the same market shares as (1, 1). Hence, α
[
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ A
2
)]
= λ(1)
2
. By solving
for A, A = 1−α
α
. By the previous steps and the fact that the prices in the
interval (α, 1) are not in the support of F 1, this implies that F 1 has an atom
at p = α of size 1− 1−α
α
= 2α−1
α
.
Step 6: F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval [p0L, α].
Proof. Suppose not. Hence, assume that there is an interval (p′, p′′) ⊆ [p0L, α]
over which F 0 is constant. By step 2, F 1 assigns zero mass to the inter-
val [p0L, α). Note that pi((p
′, 0), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
1−α
α
])
.
On the other hand, pi((p′′, 0), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
1−α
α
])
.
The latter is greater than the former, a contradiction.
Step 7: λ(1) = α.
Proof. Notice that pi((α, 1), σ) = α
[
λ(0)
2
+ λ(1)
2
]
= α
2
and pi((1, 1), σ) = λ(1)
2
.
By equating these two, λ(1) = α and, consequently, firms profits are λ(1)
2
=
α
2
.
Step 8: F 0 is defined as in the statement of theorem 2.
Proof. Let p ∈ [p0L, α]. Notice that
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
[
λ(0)(1− F 0(p)) + λ(1)
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
= p
[
(1− α)(1− F 0(p)) + α
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
= p
[
(1− α)(1− F 0(p)) + 1
2
]
=
α
2
where the last step follows from the fact that firms profits in equilibrium
are α
2
. By solving for F 0, F 0(p) = 3−2α
2(1−α) − α2(1−α)p , as desired. By solving
F (p0L) = 0 for p
0
L, p
0
L =
α
3−2α .
Step 9: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. By step 7, firms equilibrium profits are α
2
. I now check for profitable
deviations. I distinguish four sets of deviations.
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• Case (i): to (p, 0) such that p < α
3−2α . The deviation yields
p
[
(1− α) + α
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
and is profitable if and only if p > α
3−2α , a contradiction.
• Case (ii): to (p, 0) such that p ∈ (α, 1]. The deviation yields
p
(
α
1− α
α
)
and is profitable if and only if p > α
2(1−α) . Notice that the deviation is
feasible if and only if α
2(1−α) < 1 or, equivalently, α <
2
3
. However, this
is impossible, as α ≥ 2
3
holds by assumption.
• Case (iii): to (p, 1) such that p < α. The deviation yields
p
[
(1− α)1
2
+
α
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > α, a contradiction.
• Case (iv): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ (α, 1). The deviation yields
p
α
2
and is profitable if and only if p > 1, a contradiction.
There are no profitable deviations.
Hence, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof of theorem 3. Let σ be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. Denote
by pL and pH the lowest and highest prices charged with positive probability.
The proof proceeds stepwise. For the arguments of theorems 1 and 2, the
equilibrium cdf is atomless. Moreover, the lowest price charged with positive
probability is positive, because charging zero yields zero profits, but the max-
min payoff is positive.
Step 1: pH ∈ {α, 1}.
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Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that the highest price pH is strictly smaller
than α. Then pi(pH , σ) = pH
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1
2
))
. Deviating to α yields pi(α, σ) =
α
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1
2
))
, which is greater than pi(pH , σ), a contradiction.
Next, assume that the highest price pH ∈ (α, 1). Then, pi(pH , σ) =
pH
(
η1
2
)
. Notice that deviating to p = 1 is profitable, as it yields pi(1, σ) = η1
2
,
a contradiction. Hence, pH ∈ {α, 1}, as desired.
Step 2: if pL < α and pH = 1, then there is a gap in the support of F (p)
located at (α, p˜) for some p˜ ∈ (α, 1).
Proof. Assume that pL < α and pH = 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that
α and α +  both belong to the support of F (p). Notice that pi(α, σ) =
α
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1
2
+ 1−F (α)
2
)
+ η0(1− F (α))
)
. Note also that pi(α+ , σ) = (α+
)
(
η1
2
+ (ηα + η0)(1− F (α + )
)
. For a sufficiently small , the latter is
smaller than pi(α, σ). This implies that a price interval above α is assigned
zero mass, a contradiction.
I now distinguish two cases.
Case (1): pL ≥ α.
Then, it must be that pH = 1. For the arguments of theorems 1 and 2,
F is strictly increasing over the interval [pL, 1]. Assume that α ≤ η12−η1 .
Step 3.1: F (p) is equal to 0 if p < η1
2−η1 , is equal to
2−η1
2(1−η1) −
η1
2(1−η1)p if
p ∈
[
η1
2−η1 , 1
]
, and is equal to 1, otherwise.
Proof. Notice that pi(1, σ) = η1
2
, pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1
2
+ (η0 + ηα)(1− F (p)
)
. By
equating pi(1, σ) and pi(p, σ) and solving for F (p), F (p) = 2−η1
2(1−η1) −
η1
2(1−η1)p .
By solving F (pL) = 0 for pL, pL =
η1
2−η1 , which is clearly smaller than 1.
Notice that η1
2−η1 ≥ α holds by assumption.
Step 4.1: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. Notice that firms’ profits are pi(α, σ) = η1
2
. I now check for profitable
deviations.
Case (i): deviations to p < η1
2−η1 . The deviation yields pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1
2
+ ηα + η0
)
and is profitable if and only if p > η1
2−η1 , a contradiction.
There are no other possible deviations. Hence, the equilibrium exists and
is unique.
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Case (2): pL < α. I now consider two subcases.
SubCase (2a): pH = α.
For the arguments of theorems 1 and 2, F is strictly increasing over the
interval [pL, α]. Assume that α ≥ η1ηα+η1 .
Step 3.2a: F (p) is equal to 0 if p < α(1−η0)
1+η0
, is equal to η0+1
2η0
− α(1−η0)
2η0p
if
p ∈
[
α(1−η0)
1+η0
, α
]
, and is equal to 1, otherwise.
Proof. Notice that pi(α, σ) = αη1+ηα
2
and pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1+ηα
2
+ η0(1− F (p)
)
for any p ∈ [pL, α]. By equating pi(α, σ) and pi(p, σ) and solving for F (p),
F (p) = η0+1
2η0
− α(1−η0)
2η0p
. By solving F (pL) = 0 for pL, pL =
α(1−η0)
1+η0
, which is
clearly smaller than α and greater than zero.
Step 4.2a: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. Notice that firms’ profits are pi(α, σ) = αη1+ηα
2
. I now check for prof-
itable deviations.
Case (i): deviations to p > α. The deviation yields pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1
2
)
. The
deviation is profitable if and only if p > αη1+ηα
η1
. The deviation is feasible
if and only if αη1+ηα
η1
< 1 or, equivalently, α < η1
η1+ηα
. However, this is
impossible, as by assumption α ≥ η1
ηα+η1
.
Case (ii): deviations to p < α(1−η0)
1+η0
. The deviation yields pi(p, σ) =
p
(
η1+ηα
2
+ η0
)
and is profitable if and only if p > α(1−η0)
1+η0
, a contradiction.
There are no other possible deviations. Hence, the equilibrium exists and
is unique.
SubCase (2b): pH = 1.
Assume that α ∈
(
η1
2−η1 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
. Note that η1
ηα+η1
is always greater than
η1
2−η1 , so that this assumption makes sense. By step 2 and the arguments of
theorems 1 and 2, F is strictly increasing over the interval [pL, α] and over
the interval [p˜, 1], with p˜ ∈ (α, 1).
Step 3.2b: F (p) is equal to 0 if p < αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α , is equal
to
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α
2η0(1+η0−η1)α −
η1
2η0p
if p ∈
[
αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α , α
]
, is equal
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to 2α−η1−η1α
(1+η0−η1)α if p ∈
[
α, (1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α
]
, is equal to 2−η1
2(1−η1) −
η1
2(1−η1)p if p ∈
[
(1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α , 1
]
, and is equal to 1, otherwise.
Proof. Notice that pi(α, σ) = α
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1+(1−F (α))
2
)
+ η0(1− F (α))
)
and
pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1+(1−F (α))
2
)
+ η0(1− F (p))
)
for any p ∈ [pL, α]. Notice
also that pi(1, σ) = η1
2
. By equating pi(1, σ) and pi(α, σ) and solving for
F (α), F (α) = 2α−η1−η1α
(1+η0−η1)α . Notice that F (α) is strictly greater than zero
whenever α > η1
2−η1 and strictly smaller than 1 whenever α <
η1
ηα+η1
. Both
conditions hold by assumption. By equating pi(p, σ) with pi(1, σ) and solving
for F (p), F (p) =
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α
2η0(1+η0−η1)α −
η1
2η0p
. By solving F (pL) = 0 for
pL, pL =
αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α . The latter is smaller than α if and only if
α > η1
2−η1 , which holds by assumption, and always greater than zero. Notice
that pi(p′, σ) = p′
(
η1
2
+ (ηα + η0)(1− F (p′)
)
with p′ ∈ [p˜, 1]. By equating
pi(1, σ) and pi(p′, σ) and solving for F (p′), F (p′) = 2−η1
2(1−η1)−
η1
2(1−η1)p . By setting
p′ = p˜ and solving F (p˜) = F (α) for p˜, p˜ = (1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α .
The latter is greater than α if and only if α > η1
2−η1 and smaller than 1 if and
only if α < η1
η1+ηα
. Both conditions hold by assumption.
Step 4.2b: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. Notice that firms’ profits are pi(1, σ) = η1
2
. I now check for profitable
deviations.
Case (i): deviations to p ∈
[
α, (1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α
]
. The devia-
tion yields pi(p, σ) = p
(
η1
2
+ (ηα + η0)(1− F (p)
)
. The deviation is profitable
if and only if p > (1+η0−η1)αη1
2η0α+2η1+3η1α−η0η1α−2α−2η21−η21α , a contradiction.
Case (ii): deviations to p < αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α . The deviation yields
p
(
η1
2
+ ηα
(
1+(1−F (α))
2
)
+ η0
)
and is profitable if and only if p > αη1(1+η0−η1)
η1+4η0α−η0η1−η21−2η0η1α ,
a contradiction.
There are no other possible deviations. Hence, the equilibrium exists and
is unique.
This concludes the proof.
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B Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 1. The consumer is a shopper whenever a(s1, s2) =
0 or, equivalently, when both firms send out a low marketing signal. By
theorem 1, this occurs with probability 2−α
3α+2
· 2−α
3α+2
when α < 2
3
and with
probability (1− α) · (1− α), otherwise.
Similarly, the consumer is a conditional shopper whenever a(s1, s2) = α
or, equivalently, when firms send out different marketing signals. By theorem
1, this occurs with probability 2−α
3α+2
· 4α
3α+2
+ 4α
3α+2
· 2−α
3α+2
when α < 2
3
and with
probability (1− α) · α + α · (1− α), otherwise.
Finally, the consumer is an uninformed whenever a(s1, s2) = 1 or, equiv-
alently, when both firms send out a high marketing signals. By theorem 1,
this occurs with probability 4α
3α+2
· 4α
3α+2
when α < 2
3
and with probability
α · α, otherwise.
Proof of proposition 2. Assume that aspiration prices are endogenous.
Assume that α < 2
3
. By theorem 1, pi((1, 1), σ) = 4α
3α+2
1
2
= 2α
3α+2
. Next,
assume that α ≥ 2
3
. By theorem 2, pi((1, 1), σ) = α 1
2
= α
2
.
Assume now that aspiration prices are exogenous. Assume that α ≤ η1
2−η1 .
By theorem 3, pi(1, σ) = η1
2
. Next, assume that α ∈
(
η1
2−η1 ,
η1
η1+ηα
)
. By
theorem 3, pi(1, σ) = η1
2
. Finally, assume that α > η1
η1+ηα
. By theorem 3,
pi(α, σ) = α(η1+ηα)
2
.
Proof of proposition 3. Assume first that aspiration prices are endoge-
nous. Assume that α < 2
3
. Notice that when a(s1, s2) = 1 all prices are
satisfactory and the consumer sticks to the default firm. This happens when
both firms choose s = 1 and, by theorem 1, occurs with probability
(
4α
3α+2
)2
.
Next, when firm i chooses s = 1 and firm j chooses s = 0, the consumer
assigned to firm i inspects only firm i whenever the price that firm i charges
is at most α. This occurs with probability
(
4α
3α+2
)·( 2−α
3α+2
)· 1
2
. Next, when firm
i chooses s = 0 and firm j s = 1, the consumer assigned to firm i inspects
only firm i whenever the price that firm i charges is at most α. This occurs
with probability
(
4α
3α+2
) · ( 2−α
3α+2
) · 2α
2−α . Finally, if both firms choose s = 0,
then all prices are unsatisfactory implying that the consumer inspects both
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firms. Hence,
P (one firm is insp.) =
(
4α
3α + 2
)2
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)
1
2
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)
2α
2− α
=
2α(11α + 2)
(3α + 2)2
Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. The same argument applies. Hence, by theorem 2,
P (one firm is insp.) = (α)2 + α (1− α)
(
2α− 1
α
)
+ (1− α)α
= −2α2 + 4α− 1
Next, assume that aspiration prices are exogenous. Assume first that
α ≤ η1
2−η1 . In this case the consumer inspects only one firm only if his
aspiration price is 1, because firms charge prices greater than α with certainty
in equilibrium. By theorem 3, this occurs with probability η1. Next, assume
that α ∈
(
η1
2−η1 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
. In this case the consumer inspects only one firm if
either his aspiration price is 1 or his aspiration price is α and the default
firm charges a price smaller than α. By theorem 3, the probability that this
occurs is η1 + (1− η0− η1)2α−η1−η1α1+η0−ηα . Finally, assume that α ≥
η1
ηα+η1
. In this
case firms charge prices smaller than α with certainty. Hence, the consumer
inspects only the default with probability 1− η0.
Proof of proposition 4. Assume that aspiration prices are endogenous.
Assume that α < 2
3
. If both firms choose s = 1, the conversion rate is
zero as the consumer always sticks to the default. Hence, assume that firm
i chooses s = 0 and firm j s = 1. In this case the consumer assigned to
firm i buys from firm j when firm i charges a price greater than α and
firm j charges a lower price. By theorem 1, this occurs with probability(
2−α
3α+2
) (
4α
3α+2
) (
1
2
) (
1− 2α
2−α
)
. Next, assume that firm i chooses s = 1 and
firm j s = 0. In this case the consumer assigned to firm i buys from firm
j when firm i charges 1. This occurs with probability
(
4α
3α+2
) (
2−α
3α+2
) (
1
2
)
.
Finally, when both firms choose s = 0, the consumer inspects both firms and
the conversion rate is 1
2
, as firms strategies are symmetric. The probability
that the consumer switches away from the default is given by
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P (switching) =
(
2− α
3α + 2
)(
4α
3α + 2
)(
1
2
)(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)(
1
2
)
+
(
2− α
3α + 2
)2(
1
2
)
=
−15α2 + 12α + 4
2(3α + 2)2
Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. A similar argument applies. Hence, by theorem 2,
the probability that the consumer switches away from the default is given by
P (switching) = (α) (1− α)
(
1− α
α
)
+ (1− α)2
(
1
2
)
=
3
2
(1− α)2
Next, assume that aspiration prices are exogenous. Assume that α ≤
η0
2−η0 . Then, the consumer makes a price comparison with probability 1− η1.
Therefore, the switching rate is 1−η1
2
.
Next, assume that α ∈
(
η0
2−η0 ,
η1
ηα+η1
)
. In this case the consumer might
switch away from firm i when his aspiration price is either 0 or α. In the
first case, which occurs with probability η0, the probability of switching is
1
2
, because the consumer makes a price comparison regardless of the price.
In the second case, which occurs with probability ηα, the consumer switches
whenever firm i charges an unsatisfactory price and firm j charges a lower
price. This occurs with probability (1− F (α))(F (α) + 1−F (α)
2
). Overall, the
switching rate is
η21(η0α
2−2α−1)+η1{2αη1[2−α(η20+2η0−1)]}+α2(η30+3η20+3η0−3)
2α2(1+η0−η1) .
Finally, assume that α ≥ η1
ηα+η1
. In this case only the consumers whose
aspiration price is 0 make a price comparison. Therefore, the switching rate
is η0
2
.
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